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Abstract 
The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. We 
argue here that new elements need be introduced in order to approach a solution. In this 
physicalistic approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to 
universal limits set by quantum mechanics. Furthermore, the vague characterization "to be 
able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into a formulation being more 
suitable for scientific analysis. It is argued that the mind is an ’ontologically open’ system; 
a causal high-level system, the future of which cannot be reduced to the states of its 
associated low-level neural systems, not even if it is rendered physically closed. We 
believe that a positive answer to the question of free will is outlined. Downward causation 
is supported and Kim’s problem of causal overdetermination is resolved.   
 
1  Introduction and background 
Must we have the thoughts we have? Do our thoughts only happen, rather than being 
created by ourselves? Does determinism hold our will into an iron grip? The free will 
problem presumably is the most important existential problem and has generated shelf 
kilometers of literature throughout the centuries. One reason for the problematic situation 
can be traced to the most common definition of free will: ’the ability to act differently’. 
Indeed, it is hard to see any opportunity for scientific methods to determine whether we 
actually can ’act differently’ or not. How do we know whether an individual's actions are 
autonomous or predetermined? And why should even a free consciousness act differently 
in two identical situations?  
In Scheffel (2019) it is argued that consciousness cannot be represented by a theory and, 
as a consequence, that the mind-body problem is unsolvable. As will be discussed in 
section 2, the associated epistemological emergence of consciousness is related to the 
problem of free will since if, on the other hand, a theory for consciousness could be 
designed, then its behaviour would be computable or could be simulated. It would thus be 
predictable and not free. The argument was subsequently carried a step further to show 
that consciousness, as a high-level property of the mind, is ontologically emergent with 
respect to the low-level neural states. The following definition was employed: a high-level 
property is ontologically emergent with respect to properties on low-level if the latter 
form the basis for the high-level property and if it is not reducible to properties at low-
level. Following van Riel and van Gulick (2018) ontological reduction, in turn, should 
entail “identification of a specific sort of intrinsic similarity between non-representational 
objects, such as properties or events”. An ontologically irreducible property, if it exists, 
hence could not be determined by its low-level-properties or behaviour; it could not be 
characterised by a statistical or law-like behaviour in relation to its low-level components. 
In a sense its behaviour comes as a surprise to nature.  
It is found in Scheffel (2019) that extremely complex systems may feature ontologically 
emergent properties. The reasoning is based on elements of algorithmic information 
theory (Chaitin 1987) and the ontological quantum mechanical limits for information and 
computational capacity (Lloyd 2002 and Davies 2004). An elucidating example is the 
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molecule myoglobin. It consists of a polypeptide chain of 153 amino acids. On each 
position of the chain, there could be found either of 20 amino acids, rendering as many as 
20153 ≈ 10199 possible combinations. Since this number by far exceeds 10120, the 
approximate number of possible quantum mechanical states of the universe, the high 
oxygen affinity of the molecule could not be computed, even in principle. As a property it 
could not be designed, it could only evolve. 
The argument proceeds by showing that although low-level neural states form the basis 
for consciousness, consciousness is not ontologically reducible to the properties of these 
because of the extreme complexity of the cortical neural network. A main result is that if 
properties of a complex system, being the result of for example long term evolution, can 
only be manifested by the system itself - that is if nature for reasons of limited 
information storage capacity cannot accommodate a formal representation of the systems 
properties - then the system features ontologically emergent properties. In this paper we 
argue that the degree of freedom resulting from the ontologically emergent character of 
consciousness dissolves the deterministic contradiction we have been facing for freedom 
of the will.  
An argument for free will must consider causal closure and physical determinism (Popper 
and Eccles, 1977). Assuming causality, causal closure is the position that no physical 
event, like a decision formed in our brain, has a cause outside the physical world. Physical 
determinism says that a system’s future is fully determined, or specified, by its present 
state (we will touch upon microscopical uncertainties caused by quantum mechanical 
effects later).   
It is important to distinguish between the terms ’deterministic’ and ’determinable’. In this 
paper it is argued that causal closure holds and that the future of any closed physical 
system is entirely and sufficiently specified by its present state. Thus if an isolated 
physical system, in which a conscious mind is present, is started repeatedly from identical 
initial conditions, so that also its internal memory of its history is the same, it will evolve 
identically in all cases (again, quantum mechanical influences will be discussed later). 
There is no reason to assume randomness here. But, it will be argued, sufficiently 
complex systems, like consciousness, have futures that are not determinable in spite of 
being fully specified at low-level. When we say that a system is deterministic, we may 
jump to the erroneous conclusion that the system is determinable, or computable. There is 
a semantic problem here which is also present in the theory of, for example, chaotic 
dynamic systems. The case may actually be that the system is indeed fully specified for a 
unique future, with a one-to-one link between cause and effect, yet the system’s future 
cannot, not even in principle, be computed or otherwise determined. In other words, the 
system is neither epistemologically nor ontologically determined a priori (Scheffel, 2019). 
Such an externally undeterminable complex system may accommodate high-level agents, 
including subjective intentions, that lead to behaviour that may be associated with free 
will. This is the core argument that will be developed in this paper, relieving the tension 
for free will that comes with the concept of determinism.  
Can similar arguments be found in the previous vast literature on free will? Since we 
believe that emergence is a required element of a solution to the problem, the number of 
relevant articles are relatively few. Even in some modern accounts of free will, the role of 
emergence is not identified; see for example, Dennett’s and Wegner’s influential works 
(Dennett 1997, Wegner 2002). The present Wikipedia text on free will (Wikipedia 
2019) merely touches upon emergence. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(O'Connor and Franklin 2018) emergence in relation to free will is essentially neglected. 
The concept of emergence is, however, present in several discussions of consciousness 
and the mind-body problem (Kim 1999 and 2006, Chalmers 2006 and Scheffel 2019, to 
name a few).  
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Recently List (2014, 2019) has proposed a theory in support of free will. Whereas he 
avoids explicit reference to emergentism, the analysis is based on a separation between 
free will, as a ”higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology, and 
fundamental physical ”lower-level” phenomena. In his ”Why free will is real” (2019), a 
careful literature study has been carried out, with a reference list containing substantial 
recent literature on the problem of free will, both in general and related to emergence. 
This list may be supplemented by Campbell’s (1974) introduction of the concept of 
’downward causation’, Kim’s skepticism against emergence and downward causation 
(1999, 2006, 2011), recent defense of downward causation (Campbell and Bickhard 2011, 
among others) and arguments for causal efficacy without downward causation 
(Macdonald 2007).  
As in the present work, List sharpens the characterization of free will and contends that 
high-level mental phenomena supervene on lower-order physical processes but are 
irreducible to this base. According to List, free will implies intentional, goal-directed 
agency, alternative possibilities among which we can choose, and causation of our actions 
by our mental states, especially by our intentions. For the latter requirement to hold, 
emergence of consciousness and will (”intentional action”) is required. The arguments 
supporting emergence and the effect of emergence in relation to free will have, however, 
been criticized as too weak (Weissman 2019, Bonilla 2019). It is, for example, not shown 
in any detail why mental states are irreducible to physical, neuronal states. Furthermore it 
is not clear how ”thinking and intending” as ”properties of the mind, not of the brain” can 
account for mental causation.  
In this work we approach the role of emergence in relation to free will somewhat 
differently. We build on Scheffel (2019), where it was found that consciousness, as a 
property of the brain, is ontologically emergent. Subsequently we, after having sharpened 
the characterization of free will, find that emergent consciousness also features a 
remaining required property, namely to belong to the class of ’ontologically open 
systems’. This property helps to overcome the potential straitjacket with respect to 
alternative possibilities for intentional action, due to supervenience of conscious processes 
at high-level on deterministic processes at low-level, being problematic for List (Bonilla 
2019).      
We begin in section 2 by discussing to what extent the standard definition of free will is 
problematic, and introduce a slightly modified definition having the advantage of 
rendering free will scientifically determinable. In order to explain how ontological 
emergence renders determinism consistent with free will, the concept of ’ontologically 
open’ systems is introduced. Such systems are causal high-level systems, the future of 
which cannot, even in an a posteriori sense, be reduced to the states of their associated 
low-level-systems, not even if these systems are physically closed. In section 3 we argue 
that consciousness, being an ontologically emergent system, is also ontologically open. 
Thus we find that consciousness satisfies all three conditions required for free will 
according to our definition. Finally we discuss the role of subconsciousness in section 4. 
The paper ends with a discussion and conclusions.   
 
2  Alternative definition of free will  
As mentioned above, standard characterizations of free will like, for example, ’the ability 
to act differently’ are problematic. How would we resolve the question whether 
consciousness has an ’ability to act differently’? What information should be found? 
Consider, for a moment, the question ”Was Hamlet left-handed?”. This is a proper, well-
defined question, but we clearly see a problem. If Shakespeare never discussed Hamlet’s 
handedness, nor mentioned or hinted at it in any of his works, there is no information 
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available to resolve the question, ever. There is a ’gap’ between the information asked for 
and accessible reality. In the standard definition of free will, ’differently’ is about 
outcomes, which can be identified experimentally. But ’ability to act’ concerns a cognitive 
and subjective first person process to which we have no access, neither theoretically nor 
experimentally. There appears indeed to be an unsurmountable gap that cannot be crossed 
in order to obtain the required information. 
Free will can, however, be formulated slightly differently in order to render the concept 
scientifically determinable. Before we proceed to formulate a definition of this kind, let us 
temporarily ponder over the characteristics of the problem we want to solve. Imagine a 
person in a windowless, soundproof room without radio, tv, mobile phone, internet or any 
other connection to the outside world. We wonder whether the behaviour of this person is 
in principle predictable for a demon that has complete knowledge of all the present 
physical details of the situation, including the full composition of the person’s body and 
the positions of all its atoms and the forces between them, as well as a full description of 
the room that the person is situated in. In the present physicalist view, what is required is a 
solution to the physical laws that govern the system at hand. If the demon could succeed 
with such a task, free will is strongly questioned. The behaviour of the individual would 
be completely determined by externally identifiable causes, not from independent first 
person choices. An adequate definition of free will must provide ability to distinguish 
between the two cases where the demon can predict the individual’s behaviour and when 
it cannot. This is not enough, however, for demonstrating free will. Clearly, from the 
individual’s point of view wilfull actions must have been consciously, not subconsciously, 
considered in advance. This requirement must be amended and secured.   
In Carnap’s (1950) view, a transformation from the pre-scientific explicandum to a more 
precise scientific explicatum would have the advantage of rendering free will a concept 
available for scientific study. In this spirit the following definition will be employed in the 
present work: A conscious individual has free will if its behaviour takes place according 
to its intentions, the intentions are not subconsciously generated and if the individual’s 
mind is an ontologically open system.    
By ’will’ we refer to rational preferences or desires by a cognitive system for future 
actions. Furthermore, by ’ontologically open system’ is meant a causal high-level system 
the future of which cannot, even in an a posteriori sense, be reduced to the states of its 
associated low-level-systems, not even if the system is rendered physically closed.  
We motivate this definition of free will as follows. Experience tells us that basic low-level 
phenomena, like individual interactions between neurons in the cerebral cortex, are causal 
and essentially deterministic. Quantum mechanics tells us, however, that certain 
corrections of a statistical character must be taken into account, as discussed further on. 
We will thus assume that account has indeed been taken of the latter effects when we 
henceforth make use of the term ’deterministic’. If also the high-level neuronal functions 
and processes being associated with consciousness are deterministic, it may be quite 
natural to draw the conclusion that expressions of will are governed by processes outside 
its conscious control. This is a feature of the classical, deterministic argument against free 
will. On the other hand, behaviour related to ontologically open conscious systems is not 
directly reducible to earlier physical neural states. As discussed in the next section, this is 
a consequence of the ontologically emergent properties of consciousness. It should be 
noted that ontological emergence does not straightforwardly imply ontological openness; 
even if high-level properties cannot be simply reduced to those of low-level it must be 
shown how epiphenomenalism is avoided and how downward causation is possible.  
The concept of ’reduction’ is central for the argument. As discussed in Scheffel (2019), 
’reduction’ is a widely debated concept among philosophers and there is limited 
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consensus when it comes to details (van Riel and van Gulick 2018, van Gulick 2001). It is 
in our view reasonable to assume, as van Riel and van Gulick do, that ontological 
reduction should entail ”identification of a specific sort of intrinsic similarity between 
non-representational objects, such as properties or events”. An ontologically irreducible 
property, if it exists, could not be determined by its low-level-properties or behaviour; it 
could not be characterised by a statistical or law-like behaviour in relation to its low-level 
components. It is not implied by nature. It is argued in Scheffel (2019), using arguments 
from algorithmic information theory and quantum mechanics, that even assuming 
causality, the extreme complexity of consciousness, in an ontological sense, ’shields’ the 
dynamics of high-level conscious activity from that of its associated low-level 
components, the neurons. The implication for consciousness is that its high-level 
properties are not ontologically implied by its low-level neural activity. 
Returning to the definition of ontologically open systems, we need to distinguish between 
open and closed physical systems. Phenomena relating to classical open physical systems 
are generally causal, but indeterminable. These systems are open to external influence, 
and they are thus not guaranteed to evolve identically when repeatedly started from the 
same initial conditions. The associated dynamic processes should not be regarded as 
random or chancy; the point is that the system itself does not contain sufficient 
information about its future states. This becomes clear if we extend the size of the system 
to also include all of its external influences. Such an extended system may indeed be 
physically closed, causal and deterministic. Thus a physically closed system is not 
influenced by any processes outside the system itself. We will, in the next section, argue 
that consciousness ontologically behaves as a physically open system even in situations 
that could be classified as physically closed. This is indeed what is meant by an 
ontologically open system. 
For the sake of completeness we should, when discussing the dynamics of open and 
closed systems, account for that quantum mechanics implies that determinism does not 
fully apply at the very micro-level. The uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics 
implies that nature is ’blurry’ at the sub-atomic and atomic particle levels in the sense that, 
for example, the simultaneous position and velocity of a particle are quantities that cannot, 
even ontologically, be assigned exact values. For larger clusters of particles, however, like 
the molecules that make up the neurons, this effect is of much less importance, because of 
so-called quantum decoherence. The concept of ’adequate determinism’ (Goldberg, 2018 
and Wikipedia, 2019) has been coined to emphasize that the statistical determinism that 
results and is used here, in essence is correct in the macroscopic world, even if quantum 
phenomena may be important on the micro-scale.  
Returning to the definition of free will stated above, it is emphasized that the desired 
actions of a free consciousness must not turn into anything other than intended; behaviour 
must be consistent with the agent’s intentions. By ’intention’ we here adhere to the 
everyday definition ’determination to act in a certain way’. Now, if I wish to consider 
what to eat for dinner, such a reflection must be possible. My choices and actions must 
consistently and adequately follow my will. The phrasing ’takes place according to its 
intentions’ is deliberately somewhat vague in the sense that the precision we may strive 
for in our actions is sometimes not achieved; this is not because the will is not obeyed but 
rather from our physical and psychological limitations. Note also that we assume 
conscious individuals; it is not meaningful to talk about ’will’ for other systems. 
Finally, the condition that ’the intentions are not subconsciously generated’ is needed to 
ensure that the individual’s brain does not contain any hidden systems that manipulates it 
in such a manner that consciousness, in spite of being controlled this way, experiences 
intentions as its own. So-called ’character decisions’, being decisions based on our 
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experiences and consolidated positions that we make without active reflection, we treat in 
this context as conscious. We will return to these. 
There is a subtle, but important, observation to be made. Even if our conscious desires and 
decisions would be completely ruled by subconsciousness, the latter has, if the combined 
conscious/subconscious mind constitutes an ontologically open system, capacity for 
choices that are not predetermined. Thus, even if subconsciousness rules the mind, the 
individual can be regarded as morally and legally responsible for its activities due to the 
ontologically open character of its mind. As such it has, over time, had the ability to 
consciously and subjectively integrate the consequences of its actions into its 
considerations. Hence the debate concerning to what extent subconsciousness rules our 
decisions is essentially irrelevant as far as moral and legal matters are concerned if it can 
be shown that the human mind behaves as an ontologically open system. The role of 
subconsciousness for free will is discussed in more detail in section 4.   
To sum up, we have cast the characterization of free will as ’the ability to act differently’ 
into an alternative, scientifically determinable formulation in order to improve the 
methodological conditions to address the free-will problem. The gist of the traditional 
definition is retained, but the vague and immeasurable ’act differently’ is replaced with 
the notion of consciousness as ontologically open. If consciousness, even when studied as 
a physically closed system, can be shown to be ontologically irreducible and thus in 
principle undeterminable, there is room for subjective, willful and unpredictable actions. 
The task is now to address the, as it seems, inhibiting circumstance that the mind must 
feature a deterministic character in order to enable coherent low-level thought processes 
and consistent performance of its intended actions, while simultaneously feature an 
ontologically open nature in order to permit high-level self-caused actions. If this potential 
contradiction can be dissolved, there is room for free will. It is here that the ontologically 
emergent character of consciousness plays an important role. We next aim to show that 
the associated ontological irreducibility of consciousness to low-level neural states 
renders consciousness an ontologically open high-level system.  
  
3  Consciousness, determinism and downward causation 
The question thus arises how it would be possible for the brain’s essentially deterministic, 
neural low-level activity to lead to ontologically open behaviour at the higher inter-neural 
levels related to consciousness, considering that humans and consciousness are of the 
physical world.  
Experience shows that causality applies in the physical world. This means that a current 
state of a typical physical system, in terms of the positions and velocities of its 
microscopic constituents, provides a sufficient condition to take it to a subsequent state; 
cause results in effect. We usually endeavour to find and express these regularities of 
cause and effect as laws of nature. If new physical states can be found uniquely from 
previous states of the system, we talk of determinism. Stated equivalently: determinism 
implies that the evolution of a specific isolated system, if repeatedly started from identical 
initial conditions, will always be identically the same. Thus also two identical such 
systems, started with the same initial conditions, will evolve identically. Everyday events, 
such as when the billiard cue hits the cue ball which subsequently knocks down the 
yellow ball in the hole, tempt us to believe that causality and determinism are equivalent 
concepts. But they are not. The future of a specific causal physical system may actually be 
undeterminable, even disregarding the statistical nature of quantum mechanics. This can 
be due to complexity, but may also happen when the system is open in some sense, that is 
when external phenomena may have an influence.   
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Let us again consider the behaviour of a hypothetical single conscious individual placed in 
a closed room, without contact with the outside world. We are interested in whether 
predictions of the individual’s behaviour in a certain future time interval are in principle 
possible. For the sake of argument let us first consider an imagined case that we would 
deem as fundamentally indeterminable with respect to the individual’s choices and 
actions. If the individual, before making a decision, had the magic ability to consult a 
clever genie inhabiting some dimension otherwise unrelated to our physical world, the 
individual’s future would clearly not be determinable. There is no possibility to predict or 
explain the actions of this individual; the influence of the genie’s advice on the 
individual’s behaviour is comparable to when the dynamics of an open physical system is 
affected by external influences. Since the genie may have an impact on the individual’s 
choices or decisions, these are not immediate consequences of its present internal physical 
state of mind. Hence we must infer that the will of this individual is not simply the result 
of causal and deterministic dependence on its initial set-up and conditions in the physical 
world. In discussions of determinism, in a similar vein as that of Laplace in Essai 
philosophique sur les probabilities (1814), it is often asserted that given the positions and 
velocities of all particles in the universe as well as the forces acting upon them, the future 
of the universe would be in principle determinable. The argument implicitly assumes the 
continual action of the laws of nature. In the thought experiment, the genie has the effect 
of breaking this chain of events. 
Returning to reality, we will now assert that the genie of the thought experiment can, with 
a similar result, be replaced by the individual’s ontologically emergent thought processes, 
to which are added subjective preferences acquired during the individual’s earlier history. 
Will is about planning; experience plays a central role. The individual’s experiences are 
personal and internally rated subjectively, and subsequently stored as memories, 
constituting a basis for future preferences. These preferences are consciously or 
unconsciously consulted, similarly as in the case of the genie, when making decisions. 
Such processes are, as argued in Scheffel (2019), ontologically emergent processes where 
subjective positive or negative connotations have been related to various events, actions 
and choices. Thus consciousness acts as an open system in the sense that its current neural 
activity is ontologically detached from its current physical low-level situation. The fact 
that in principle one can, atom by atom in a Laplacian sense, construct the individual’s 
entire network of coupled neurons is not relevant here. The system has built in subjective 
preferences, the character of which are ontologically ’unknown’ (memories have no 
ontological meaning considered at low-level), featuring an independence comparable to 
taking advice from a genie. Ontological emergence is crucial in that it decouples the 
physical low-level state of the individual as a system from its subjective properties and 
behaviour. It grounds freedom rather than lawfulness.  
The main point of the genie thought experiment is to introduce an element which is 
missing in a third person, or ontological, representation of the mind. This element is 
beyond the third person notion of deterministic factors in the dynamics. The reason the 
genie parable is relevant here is that it helps to understand downward causation. Think of 
it this way. Assume, for the sake of argument, that an emergent property P of a conscious 
system formally can be found from the time-dependent solution of a set of neurophysio-
logical relations for the system, modelled by the equation Df = 0, in which D = D(f) is a 
linear or nonlinear time- and space-dependent matrix differential and/or algebraic operator 
working on the variable vector f = f(t,x,y,z) with components fi (i = 1…N) that represent 
the N functions and properties that formally provide a complete description of the 
conscious system. Since we assume that P is an emergent property, it is in principle 
impossible to, in a third-person perspective, specify all the functions fi in detail. But 
neu
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constructed for limited subsets of neural interactions related to the realization of the 
property P, such as firings of clusters of neurons. These theories, associated with a third-
person view of cortical neural processes, would necessarily employ a reduced set of 
variables, say f1,f2,…fM, for which M < N, since the conscious system features further 
properties than those associated with low-level. Assuming that the property P is 
ontologically emergent, the variables fM+1…fN have a relation to first-person processes 
only; P cannot be reduced to a physical, low-level relation to these variables. This means 
that the variables fM+1…fN and the subset of system relations Df = 0, for fi with i = 
M+1…N, determining their temporal evolution, represent a degree of freedom for 
consciousness, not deterministically related to low-level, third-person accounts of neural 
processes. We may view this abstract formalisation as a representation of causal laws for 
the high-level emergent properties that enable conscious thought. It is the associated 
degree of freedom that decouples consciousness from low-level determinism and allows 
for mental processes associated with downward causation. Also MacLaughlin (1992) and 
Chalmers (2006) discuss the possibility for irreducible high-level phenomena to exert a 
causal efficacy and opens up for the existence of high-level laws. 
To elucidate the above we may employ the thought experiment introduced in Scheffel 
(2019). A particular type of human-like robot, equipped with body parts, limbs, joints and 
muscles, is able to walk and run. It could not, by any means, be designed to jump without 
falling, however, due to its particular construction and its complexity. Furthermore, the 
robot is designed to be able to store in its memory, and make use of, movements that 
would be advantageous for the tasks it was programmed to carry out. After having been 
deployed on an island for a certain time, together with other identical robots, in order to 
carry out certain duties (all being able to communicate with one another) it was later 
surprisingly found that the robots had evolved the ability to jump without falling. The 
robots thus carried out new tasks, like reaching new parts of the island that previously 
were inaccessible due to obstacles like ditches. 
In this thought experiment no theory can describe the evolved property to jump. This 
property is thus epistemologically emergent. Had the designers of the robot been asked 
before returning to the island to theoretically model any specific task to be carried out by 
the robots, jumping would not be included in their models. It is even quite likely that their 
theories would fail to provide an adequate picture of the robot activities on the island. Any 
attempt to describe, model, understand, predict or control these robots would thus be 
incomplete. Referring to the formal reasoning above, it is clear that the models would 
employ only a limited number of variables M, which would not suffice to include the 
additional N-M degrees of freedom being accessible for the jumping robots. 
The emerged property, to be able to jump, was here apparent from inspection, that is from 
a third-person perspective. Let us now relate this thought experiment to consciousness and 
free will. Hence we should move from epistemological to ontological emergence. As 
argued in Scheffel (2019) the difference primarily lies in the degree of complexity; a 
sufficiently complex system could develop ontologically emergent properties. In the 
example of the Jumping robot, this would mean that its evolved ability to jump would be 
irreducible to its low-level properties, even if the computational capacity of the universe 
was available. This would be the case when, for example, the positions and motions of all 
its limbs must be tailored with a very high degree of precision. Hence we could carry out 
a similar discussion as above for the case that jumping, as a property of the robots, 
evolves as an ontologically emergent property that can not be deterministically accounted 
for, not even in principle. It is, of course, not likely that the robots will develop such 
behaviour but we are now able to see how a similar case can be argued for consciousness 
and will. The brain, with its extremely complex cortical neural network, may in a similar 
manner feature properties that cannot, neither epistemically nor ontologically, be 
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deterministically reduced to low-level neuronal properties and processes. Consciousness 
would, in analogy with the Jumping robot, feature a degree of freedom that is beyond 
deterministic processes at the physical low-level, allowing for downward causation. 
Whereas the robot’s ability to jump was distinguishable in a third-person perspective, the 
activity of consciousness and will is, however, distinguishable from a first-person 
perspective only. The standard, third person, scientific and low-level deterministic relation 
to consciousness halts as emergent behaviour takes over. It cannot reach over this barrier 
to represent and contribute to understanding of subjective first person experience. 
It is, at this point, worthwhile to reconsider the problematic concept of determinism in 
relation to downward causation. There is indeed reason to assert that determinism, in its 
standard interpretation, is an inadequate concept for fully characterizing the causal 
situation for mental processes. Speaking of determinism in relation to neurophysiological 
processes, we ususally refer to physical, low-level determinism, at the atomic and 
molecular levels. As we have argued, high-level mental processes are, however, also 
dependent on emergent properties associated with complex, large scale phenomena. It is 
thus motivated to introduce a concept of ”high-level determinism” for these processes, 
where also the dynamics of emergent processes that cannot be reduced to low-level are 
taken into account. Again considering the Jumping robot we may assume, for the sake of 
argument, that its complexity renders jumping an ontologically emergent property. 
Beyond low-level determinism, that applies to non-emergent properties, the robot may 
consider jumping instead of walking or running for achieving certain tasks. This high-
level deterministic process is autonomous with regards to low-level determinism since its 
behaviour is irreducible to low-level. This is similar to the situation when we make 
conscious decisions based on our preferences and previous experiences. Hence standard, 
low-level determinism cannot represent mental will processes. This completes our 
argument for that consciousness is an ontologically open system. Conscious activity 
cannot, even in an a posteriori sense, be reduced to the states of its associated low-level-
systems, not even if the system is rendered physically closed.      
List (2019) argues that, instead of low-level, ”physical determinism”, mental processes are 
governed by ”agential indeterminism”. Semantically, this is an unfortunate label, since it 
leads the thought to probabilistic, or random, processes. Furthermore the argument for 
agential indeterminism fails to consider that, although what he terms ”psychological-level 
states” may have been caused by non-identical low-level neuronal states and thus on a 
psychological-level may feature bifurcating futures, it must be explained why and how 
psychological-level states become, at least partly, independent of physical (low-level) 
states. Low-level determinism does not vanish by mere focusing on high-level processes. 
In the present work we have introduced the concept of ontological openness in order to 
show how ontological emergence decouples standard, low-level determinism from 
emergent high-level conscious activity, thus enabling downward causation.  
We started this section by asserting that determinism implies that the evolution of a 
specific system, if repeatedly started from identical initial conditions, will always be 
identically the same. Have we now resolved the resulting difficulty for free will? A central 
argument here is ontological openness, exemplified by the genie. Clearly, if the relation to 
the genie is external to the physical low-level system on which the specific consciousness 
supervenes, expressions of will are autonomous in relation to the physical low-level 
system. If the genie, on the other hand, is internal to (supervenes on) the system, it would 
appear that the physical low-level situation determines its actions and we are back to the 
original problem. As we have seen, this is however not the case, due to downward 
causation. This is a high-level deterministic process, that defeats low-level determinism 
and may introduce causal laws at high-level. Thus, the conscious system that we consider 
may be regarded as fully deterministic but not only on physical, low-level, but also on 
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emergent high-level. This is why the system is deterministic, but indeterminable in 
principle. It is the genie, or rather the equivalent ontologically open processes related to 
consciousness, that enable high-level downward causation. By taking into account 
subjective first-person experiences and memories, autonomous will is formed.   
In short, the problem with claiming that determinism implies that the evolution of a 
specific system, if repeatedly started from identical initial conditions, will always be 
identically the same in relation to consciousness is the fact that although the outcome of a 
will process can only be a specific one, this does not mean that the outcome is settled 
beforehand. It is only when indeterminable high-level deterministic processes including 
accounts of subjective first-person preferences and experiences, associated with 
downward causation, are included that the evolution of the system becomes fully 
specified. Low-level determinism does not determine the evolution of the system.   
To sum up, we have argued that consciousness is an ontologically open high-level system 
and thus third-person indeterminable and uncontrollable in principle. Conscious will is, 
rather than being determined by low-level neural properties, the result of ontologically 
emergent high-level processes including accumulated subjective experiences, stored as 
memories. Having eliminated straightforward dependence on low-level neural properties, 
we have thus also eliminated epiphenomenalism.  
In the process, we have also discussed how downward causation (Campbell, 1974 and 
Kim, 2006) enters. We have presented a solution to the question of overdetermination 
with regards to the causal situation for consciousness; termed the causal exclusion 
principle by Kim (2006). Kim argues that if the dynamics of consciousness is determined 
by its current state and the laws of nature, then emergent phenomena cannot exist 
independently; they must be a result of the complete set of conditions already provided. 
Otherwise we seem to be facing an overdetermined problem. But we can now see that the 
solution to this dilemma is that emergent properties are of the same nature as the new 
conditions that may present themselves when a closed system is transformed into an open 
system. Hence they are additional conditions, being governed by associated additional 
relations. Mathematically speaking, just as many new equations are added as new 
variables. Thereby overdetermination is avoided. In our example of the person being 
placed in a closed room, this could correspond to the door being opened. Emergent 
properties have thus, as far as deterministic control is concerned, the same impact on the 
development of the system as external influences have on an open system. This solution to 
the problem of overdetermination explains how downward causation can take place. 
Interacting emergent phenomena can determine the development of the system (in this 
case, the mind) to a large extent independently of the causal situation at lower levels. The 
nature of consciousness as an ontologically open system removes the necessity for 
supervenient bottom-up causality. 
Ontological emergence of consciousness is essential for free will. If consciousness were 
merely epistemologically emergent, an imagined powerful demon, with access to all 
physical information in the universe including all details of the individual’s 
consciousness, could in principle manipulate the individual to act in any specific way by 
engineering its low-level neurons. An ontologically emergent consciousness is, however, 
without reach for the demon; it is free in the sense that it cannot be understood nor 
controlled, even in principle.          
We have, in the above, argued for that the mind is an ontologically open system from a 
physicalistic and thus monistic position. Interestingly, the same result seems to follow 
from a dualist perspective. Space here only allows us to touch upon this subject, which 
will be dealt with elsewhere. Assume for a moment that dualism holds; there is both a 
material and a somehow separated ’mental dimension’ associated with consciousness. 
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What characterises activity in the mental dimension? Certainly not randomness; scientific 
analysis of mental behaviour speaks against this. But if the mental dimension features 
regularity and law-bound processes we face a similar question as when taking the 
physicalistic stance: what is the maximum freedom that can be excerted by the will, given 
the laws of nature? A natural conclusion seems to be that dualism does not provide 
conscious will with higher degrees of freedom than those found within physicalism. 
 
4  Willed intentions and the role of subconsciousness 
Free will requires, in line with the definition employed here, that individual behaviour 
takes place according to the individual's intentions. This condition is not really 
problematic; it is satisfied by our experiences. The individual’s everyday functioning is 
completely dependent on that she consistently carries out what she decides. Does she 
decide to return to the pavement in order to avoid an approaching car, she returns. Does 
she want to make herself a cup of coffee, she makes it. Exceptions that can be identified, 
such as in the latter case a shortage of coffee or an interruption due to a ringing phone, are 
not about principal mental limitations but of properties of the outside world. 
So far, we have presented arguments for that consciousness/subconsciousness as a 
combined system meets the requirements for free will. But few would regard this as 
sufficient; if our volitional decisions, in spite of their onthologically open origin, are 
unconsciously dictated to us it would be difficult to speak of free will. There is evidence 
that consciousness in a vast number of situations exerts its will without significant 
influence from mind processes that we would refer to as subconscious. It should be noted, 
however, that there is a spectrum of degrees of collaboration between the two. Our 
experiences of dreams show that subconsciousness may be active when we are not 
consciously aware. Driving a car along a well-known road is a well known example of 
symbiosis between consciousness and subconsciousness; we experience ourselves 
alternating between actively reacting to the current traffic situation as well as being deeply 
immersed in our own thoughts. Participation in an intense discussion, where rapid reponse 
is required, is an example of consciousness mainly acting on its own. But the independent 
role of consciousness and the will has been strongly questioned over the past few decades 
and some authors talk of ”the illusion of free will”. Support has been partly found from 
neuroscience. A ’readiness potential’, being activated unconsciously well before we make 
conscious decisions, appears to reveal that the main decision-making takes place beyond 
consciousness. A pioneer in the field was Libet (1985), who used an electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) and placed small electrodes at various points on the scalp of subjects to 
measure neuronal activity in the cortex. He found that EEG signals, related to certain 
wilfull actions, could be recorded as long as half a second before the subjects admitted to 
having made a decision. Experiments in this field has, however, many possible sources of 
error, thus criticism comes from several places (Klemm, 2010 and 2016, Baumeister et al, 
2011). We now briefly consider some of these arguments. 
In certain practical situations it is, from an evolutionary point of view, crucial that 
consciousness may act undisturbed. The need for rapid and well balanced decisions, as 
when we are driving a car and we suddenly need to consider how to avoid a car that 
suddenly wobbles into the roadway, is one example. In a very short time we need to 
perform a large number of considerations, including how to avoid colliding with people 
while at the same time ensure our own safety. The subconscious mind would not, with the 
associated delay that Libet’s and other experiments show, find the time required to gather 
all the relevant information in order to survey the situation and in a short time deliver 
adequate decisions that do not conflict with our conscious perception and handling of the 
situation. Certainly, if conscious decisions would not be important in situations like these, 
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evolution would likely have provided us with a mechanism that automatically disconnects 
consciousness in favour of subconsciousness, like when we react reflexively. Furthermore 
it is well known that, upon learning new knowledge and skills, performance is gradually 
taken over by the subconscious as we become more knowledgeable and skilful. But for 
the beginner who sits down at a piano, the subconscious mind is completely unprepared. 
There is no way for the subconscious to control the finger movements because it does not 
’know’ what should be done (Klemm, 2010). Obviously more research is needed to 
identify to which degree subconsciousness impacts on our actions. In many similar 
situations, however, subconsciousness cannot reasonably play a significant role. 
The continuous cooperation between consciousness and the unconscious points to a 
second argument why consciousness is not controlled by the subconscious. Neuroscience 
shows that a significant part of the ’processors’ of the brain used for conscious thought are 
also used for unconscious processes (Dehaene, 2014). This supports the idea that also 
subconscious neural processes are ontologically emergent. Thus, whereas determinable 
low-level processes are associated with communication between consciousness and the 
unconscious, these systems can both, on high-level, be assumed to behave as ontologically 
open systems that to a large extent act independently. As pointed out, experience shows 
that we can consciously cancel impulsive intentions, using ”free won’t” (Libet, 1985).  
From one perspective, we do not necessarily need to distinguish between consciousness 
and subconsciousness as separated global systems. Already individual neurological 
subsystems associated with the mind appear to be sufficiently complex to render their 
interaction ontologically emergent and thus ontologically open. In the subject of game 
theory similar results have, interestingly enough, been found. Emergent behaviour has 
been observed in simulations of nonlinear interaction between two players, who both act 
in order to optimize their game while trying to act unpredictable for the opponent, if 
players are allowed to make use of the game’s history (West and Lebiere, 2001). 
A complication related to the definitions of subconscious and conscious choices is what 
might be called ’character decisions’ (Danto and Morgenbesser, 1957). Based on previous 
experience and reflections, people accumulate different, often conscious, positions or 
traits of character that could lead to routine behaviour in certain situations. Facing an 
approaching threatening individual, for example, certain people will normally escape 
while others preferably stay to deal with the danger. This behaviour does not necessarily 
constitute an active conscious choice of the type we have discussed so far, but may rather 
be a result of the individual’s disposition to act in such situations. Clearly, most of us 
would admit to struggling with some undesirable traits of character, but this fact is not 
central for the question of free will. Since the individual normally is aware of her traits of 
character, we here consider the nature of character decisions to be conscious rather than 
unconscious. The topic is interesting and should preferably be treated in more detail.  
Our feelings, thoughts and choices do not simply happen to us. They develop emergently 
in a cooperation between high-level consciousness and the unconscious employing basic, 
low-level neural processes. But how, then, can our thoughts and subjective feelings take 
form in a structured and coherent way? What is the detailed interplay between 
consciousness and subconsciousness? These important questions are not analyzed here. Of 
prime interest for free will is that high-level thoughts, subjective feelings and conscious 
choices arise in a manner which is irreducible and indeterminable in principle.   
 
5  Discussion  
Our analysis of free will is consistent with non-reductive physicalism, where mental states 
supervene on physical states but cannot be reduced to them. Thus there are similarities 
with Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism (Davidson, 1970) in which the Anomalism 
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Principle implies that there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be 
predicted or explained by other events. The present work provides an explanation for the 
non-existence of such laws.  
It is of interest to discuss the relation to naturalistic dualism (Chalmers, 2007). In this 
nonreductive theory, with some characteristics common to property dualism, it is argued 
that there is an unbridgeable explanatory gap between objective and subjective 
experience. Consciousness is here a fundamental property, ontologically autonomous of 
the physical properties upon which it supervenes (see also Chalmers 1995). A theory for 
consciousness would thus call for a set of high-level ”psychophysical laws”, much like 
electromagnetism requires Maxwell’s equations for a description rather than merely basic 
Newtonian laws. Although similarities exist with the present theory, it should be noted 
that supervenience on a low-level, neurophysiological basis here leads to a monistic view 
on consciousness. As ontologically open, the mind features a freedom much like Gödel-
unprovable statements do in mathematics. Gödel-unprovable ’high-level’ statements 
’supervene’ on provable theorems of standard, ’low-level’ mathematics. Further high-
level Gödel-unprovable statements can be generated by combining Gödel-unprovable 
statements with themselves or standard mathematics. Complexity at the low-level is the 
root of all this; it provides independent and unprovable statements in mathematics as well 
as independence and freedom for the mind in the physical world. But complexity also 
works at low-level, hence in the theory outlined here both physical and mental properties, 
supervening on physical substance, interact simultaneously. It would thus seem more 
natural to associate consciousness with a monistic rather than dualistic view.    
It is argued in Scheffel (2019) that consciousness is ontologically emergent. Employing 
the  definitions used, epistemological emergence of consciousness also follows; no theory 
for explaining consciousness can be formulated. This result is of interest for the problem 
of free will since if, on the other hand, a theory for consciousness could be designed, then 
its behaviour would be computable or could be simulated. It would thus be predictable 
and not free, that is - if we could understand consciousness, there would be no room for 
free will. It is surprising that this is not discussed to any large extent in the literature.    
Clearly, we here present a compatibilistic theory for free will. It is found, however, that 
standard low-level determinism is inapplicable to conscious processes at high-level, where 
downward causation necessitates a form of high-level determinism.  
Then, what is there more to say about epiphenomenalism, the notion that mental states are 
only by-products of the physical states and unable to causally influence these? As 
discussed above, the form of non-reductive physicalism assumed here is not a form of 
property dualism, or dualism of any sort (see Robinson 2017 for an excellent review). 
Although mental states are not deducible from basic neurological states, they certainly 
correspond to physical states; they supervene on these. Non-reductionism follows because 
of the emergent character of mental states, not because of lack of two-way interaction 
between physical and mental states. Clearly, epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the 
present theory.  
For some of the topics discussed in this section more research is certainly required in 
order to reach conclusive arguments.  
 
6  Conclusion 
It is found that high-level cognitive processes are ontologically open, even though 
underlying physical laws and low-level neural processes may be assumed essentially 
deterministic in the standard sense. By an ’ontologically open’ system we mean a causal 
high-level system, the future of which cannot be reduced to the states of its associated 
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low-level-systems, not even in situations where the system is physically closed. The 
analysis builds on that consciousness is ontologically emergent (Scheffel, 2019). In 
consequence the activity of consciousness is not determinable, not even in principle. To 
consider the impact on volitional processes, a scientifically and methodologically more 
applicable definition of free will than the widely used ’ability to act differently’ is 
suggested. The three associated requirements for free will are all argued to be satisfied; 
that the individual’s actions take place on the basis of its intentions, that these intentions 
have not been subconsciously forced onto the individual and that the individual’s mind 
constitutes an ontologically open system. Thus the will, as defined here, is free.  
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